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does the statute authorize a monetary recovery against the United States,0 again
contrary to the English view.11 Despite the obvious equities existing in favor
of the defendant in the principal case, the oversight in not having submitted the
claim to the proper accounting official 12 barred the assertion of the set-off. Had
the claim been submitted, the court would have been faced with the nice problem
of deciding whether the transaction had resulted in a sale to the United States.3
But it is doubtful if an opposite decision would have been reached; for the
Stabilization Corporation, although clearly a governmental agency,'" is owned
by private shareholders, and would probably be regarded as an entity distinct
from the government. 15 It seems indeed unfortunate that the Agricultural Mar-
keting Act, so evidently aimed to aid the farmer, should be frustrated by the
technicalities of legal principle and precedent.
TAXATION-INHERITANCE TAXES-DRRANCE'S ESTATE-CONFLICTING
ADJUDICATIONS OF DOMICIL AS A DENIAL OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-Dr.
John T. Dorrance died in 193o with residences in both New Jersey and Pennsyl-
vania. Both states assessed inheritance taxes, amounting to about $i7,oooooo
each, on his intangible personalty, each claiming that he was domiciled within its
borders. An appeal from the Pennsylvania tax was upheld by the Supreme Court
of that state.' Certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court on the
ground that no federal question was involved ; 2 the Pennsylvania tax was accord-
ingly paid. The instant action was an appeal from the New Jersey assessment,
alleging that the adjudication by the Pennsylvania court was final as to the
question of domicil. Held, that the Pennsylvania court was without jurisdiction
in this matter since Dr. Dorrance was domiciled in New Jersey, and that therefore
full faith and credit need not be given to the decree and the New Jersey tax was
United States v. Eckford, 73 U. S. 484 (1867) ; United States v. Nipissing Mines Co.,
2o6 Fed. 431 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913), certiorari denied, 234 U. S. 765, 34 Sup. Ct. 673 (1914).
Somewhat curiously, this is not the law when the United States institutes a suit in admiralty.
There it is held the defendant may cross-libel and recover a monetary judgment against the
United States. United States v. Norwegian Barque "Thekla", 266 U. S. 328, 45 Sup. Ct. 112
(1924). Contra: Bowker v. United States, 1O5 Fed. 398 (D. N. J. I9OO), aff'd, 186 U. S.
135, 22 Sup. Ct. 802 (1902).
IAppu v. The Queen's Advocate, 53 L. J. P. C. 72 (1884).
'In United States v. McCarl, 275 U. S. I, 48 Sup. Ct. 12 (927), it was held that the
Comptroller General cannot be mandamused to consider claims against the United States
Emergency Fleet Corporation, even though it is a government-owned corporation. In the
principal case, at 578, the court suggested that the claim should have been submitted to the
Federal Farm Board, or to the officers of the Stabilization Corporation. See Schnell and
Wettach, Corporations as Agencies of the Recovery Progrant (1934) 12 N. C. L. REV. 77-80.
'Because the alleged set-off was for more than $io,ooo, the problem would be further
complicated by procedural difficulties. Granting the existence of a valid claim against the
United States, it has been suggested that the proper procedure would be a stay of proceed-
ings, pending the prosecution of a suit by the defendants in the Court of Claims. (934) 34
CoL. L. REv. 375.
A Board of Trade v. Wallace, 67 F. (2d) 402, 408 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933).
In Schnell and Wettach, supra note 12, at 95, the conclusion is reached that the entity
of governmentally controlled private corporations will be disregarded only insofar as neces-
sary to protect the interests of the United States. See Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. Emergency
Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549, 42 Sup. Ct. 386 (1922) ; United States Shipping Board etc. v.
Harwood, 281 U. S. 519, 50 Sup. Ct. 372 (193o). But cf. United States v. Strang, 254 U. S.
491, 41 Sup. Ct. 165 (1921) ; United States Grain Corp. v. Phillips, 261 U. S. 1O6, 43 Sup.
Ct. 283 (1923) ; Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union, 275 U. S. 415, 48 Sup. Ct. 198
(1928). For a detailed and comprehensive treatment of this angle of the principal case, see
(1934) 34 COL. L. REV. 374.
'Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 Atl. 303 (1932).2 Sub non Dorrance v. Pennsylvania, 287 U. S. 66o, 53 Sup. Ct. 222 (1932).
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validly assessed.' In re Dorrance's Estate. 17o Atl. 6oi (N. J. Prerogative
Ct. 1934).
Since the rule is settled that full faith and credit need be given only where the
judgment offered as binding was pronounced by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion,4 it was within the province of the New Jersey court to examine the facts
upon which jurisdiction in Pennsylvania was assumed. In conjunction with the
finding that Dr. Dorrance was not domiciled in Pennsylvania, he was found to
be domiciled in New Jersey, so that the New Jersey tax becomes proper on the
principle that intangible personalty is taxable at the domicil.5  While stating
practically the same principles of Conflict of Laws and many of the same authori-
ties,6 but emphasizing different facts,7 the two courts found the decedent domiciled
in their respective states. The New Jersey Court of Appeals and Errors will
undoubtedly affirm, and an appeal to the United States Supreme Court is almost
certain to follow. A denial of certiorari is improbable since there will bei the
problem of full faith and credit and another very likely argument in double
taxation as a deprivation of property without due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The alternative courses which appear to be open to the Court may
be listed as follows: (i) It may hold that the New Jersey court is required to
give full faith and credit to the Pennsylvania decree-a result which would be
an absolute change in the interpretation hitherto made of that constitutional
clause 8 and therefore unlikely. (2) The decision may be that though the question
of domicil is solely for the forum state to decide, a second assessment would
constitute a violation of due process, and is therefore not permissible. Such a
decision would encourage a race among states for inheritance taxes, so that the
one first collecting would be secure-again an improbable solution. (3) Another
possibility is a finding, as in the last suggestion, that the matter of domicil is solely
for the forun state and that the resulting double taxation is not a deprivation
without due process. Though the situations where the Court has held against
"double taxation" are in some degree distinguishable,' the facts are not so radi-
s The state also sought to establish an estoppel on the executors since the deceased's will
had been probated in New Jersey, allowances for services had been made to them in the New
Jersey courts and affidavits had been made that the decedent was domiciled in New Jersey.
However, the court refused to consider these arguments and dealt with the main issues-a
course of action which is to be highly commended.
' Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350, 20 Sup. Ct. 446 (19oo) ; Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U. S.
43, 28 Sup. Ct. I (19o7) ; Burbank v. Ernst, 232 U. S. 162, 34 Sup. Ct. 299 (1914).
'Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 28o U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (193o) ; First
Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 174 (1932).
6 Dickinson v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 181 Mass. 195, 63 N. E. 331 (1902) ; Williamson
v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619, 34 Sup. Ct. 442 (94), and various sections in the following works
of which the most recent editions are cited: CONFLICT OF LAWs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst.
193o) Proposed Final Draft No. i; DicEY, CoNmcr OF LAws (5th ed. 1932) ; STORY, CON-
FLICT OF LAws (8th ed. 1883).
Pennsylvania, for example, emphasizes the relatively greater amount of time spent, the
cost of maintenance and greater comforts of the Pennsylvania residence. The New Jersey
court stresses the various utterances of the decedent as important evidence of his intention.
It also implies that Dr. Dorrance was forced by the social desires of his wife and family to
acquire a Pennsylvania home, but that deep in his heart he always meant to come back to the
old homestead in New Jersey. On the other hand the Pennsylvania court pictures the doctor
as scheming to avoid taxation but really intending to reside in Pennsylvania.8 Supra note 4. See also Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause (1933) 81 U. OF
PA. L. REy. 371.9 Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 6o3 (1925) (tangible personalty may
be taxed only at sitim) ; Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59
(1929) (intangibles not taxable at domicil of equitable owner, since taxed at domicil of
holder of legal title) ; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (193o) (bank de-
posits taxable only at domicil of decedent) ; Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282
U. S. I, 5, Sup. Ct. 54 (1930) (unsecured debts taxable only at domicil of decedent creditor,
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cally different as to suggest a departure here from its customary disapproval. A
further obstacle is the rule of taxation at domicil only, and an unwavering
principle that a man may have but one domicil at any one time.'0  (4) Still another
course for the Court to take would be to decide that in a case as here presented,
where the denial of full faith and credit is based on a question of domicil, it would
review the facts establishing domicil. This is a function which the Supreme
Court has successfully avoided in the past.:' But even if now assumed, it would
prove helpful only if there were a finding in favor of domicil in Pennsylvania.
Should the finding be of a New Jersey domicil, the double taxation problem would
crop up again, as the executors would be without a remedy to recover the tax
paid Pennsylvania.12  Which of these solutions the Court will adopt is very
problematical, but the ultimate decision will certainly prove a landmark in the
law.' 3
TORTS-LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURER OF DANGEROUS ARTICLES TO PER-
SONS NOT IN PRIVITY OF CONTRACT-DEFEcTS WHIcH MAKE A, CHATTEL
"DANGEROUS"-Plaintiff, an employee of a motortruck owner, sued manufac-
turer of truck for injuries sustained when allegedly defective door handle gave
way, causing the door to open suddenly and plaintiff to be thrown through the
door and fall under the truck. Held (one justice dissenting), that the alleged
defect was not one which made a truck "a thing of danger", and therefore no
cause of action was stated. Cohen v. Brockway Motor Truck, Corp., 268 N. Y.
Supp. 545 (App. Div. 1934).
In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,' the New York Court of Appeals held,
and the ruling has received wide support from the courts 2 and legal writers,3 that
a manufacturer of a chattel owes the affirmative obligation to employ reasonable
not at domicil of debtor) ; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 5 (public
securities not taxable by any state other than domicil) ; First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine,
supra note 5 (state of incoporation could not tax shares of stock left by decedent domiciled
in another state).
" CONFLICr OF LAws RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. i93o) Proposed Final Draft No. i
§ 13; GooDRIcir, CoFLucr OF LAws (1927) § 14.
In an excellent comment on the Dorrance decision in Pennsylvania, Note (1932) 8i U.
OF PA. L. REv. 177, the suggestion is made in favor of this type of finding, on the grounds
that the rare cases, in which two state supreme courts will find the same individual domiciled
within their borders, usually involve a case of attempted evasion of a higher tax and should
not be given much sympathy, and that the Supreme Court is not absolutely declared against
double taxation. The writer, however, fails to dispose of, though he does mention, the
two fundamental rules that inheritance taxes on intangibles are assessed only at the domicil,
and that a man can have but one domicil at any one time.
u Cf. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394, 37 Sup. Ct. 152 (1917) ; Tilt v. Kel-
sey, supra note 4.
'a The decision by the state supreme court would conclude action in the state courts, while
the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids action in the federal
courts.
' Some procedure whereby the states could be joined in an action involving a controversy
like the present one might seem a possible remedy. But objections such as overcrowding the
Supreme Court dockets and the fact that the controversy is not really between the states to
bring it within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court seem to be substantial bars.
See Note (1932) 81 U. oF PA. L. REV. 177.
1217 N. Y. 382, I1 N. E. 1O5O (igi6).
IGoullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F. (2d) 310 (C. C. A. 6th, 193o) ; Marsh Wood Prod-
ucts Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 24o N. W. 392 (1932).
3 TORTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 193o) Tentative Draft No. 5 § 265, COMMENTARIES
ON ToRTs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1930) § 265; BURDIcK, TORTS (1926)1544; H PER,
TORTS (I933) 246; Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their Imn-
inediate Vendees (929) 45 L. Q. REV. 343, 353.
